Integration theory Essay

In introducing the revisionist phase of integration theory, Haas (1971: 26–30) explicitly withdrew his earlier exclusion of public opinion. This is particularly evident in his new ‘master concept’ of authority legitimacy transfer or sharing: ‘a formulation I would myself prefer to the stress put on elite loyalties in my own earlier formulations’. Indicators of this concept are observable in activity ‘in specific functional and organizational sectors and. . . in elite and mass perceptions’ (emphasis added). The acceptance of public opinion in the political arena is very transparent in the linkage of variables that quantify the percentage of interaction within the context of the masses and the elites’ political perception. Haas advocates focusing on the notion of social learning as a major link, speculating on the various elements that might be involved; for example, increased contact and familiarity, growing complexity in the pattern of inter-group loyalties and social roles, education and informal socialization practices and progressively rewarding experiences derived from the activities of common markets. On the other hand, Schmitter (1971: 233) is quite explicit about his revisionist intentions, offering ‘a revised formalization of the neo-functionalist or structuralist theory of the political consequences of regional integration with pretensions to general comparative relevance. ’ the significant factor in this theory lies on the connection of the differing variables and hypothesis in accordance to the attitudes and perceptions of the populace, which represents numerous political groups and parties. It all depends, therefore, on whether one takes a broad or narrow definition of these groups. Schmitter does not explicitly address this question but a broad definition is clearly implied by his operationalization of the variables in question. Thus the variable â€Å"elite value complementarity† is operationalized by reference to ‘panel type survey data on the nature and intensity of commitment to similar goals within and across integrating units’. That the operationalization includes public opinion data is clear from the accompanying footnote which includes reference to Inglehart’s work on public opinion and European integration. Similarly, regional identity is operationalized by reference to ‘panel survey research on selected samples exposed to intensive regional socialization; inference from single surveys on the residual importance of regional contacts/level of information when controlled for other variables’, and Inglehart’s work is again cited (Schmitter 1971: 252). Thus, we can infer that neo-functionalism’s principles are geared towards the affirmation on the importance of public opinion. In the development of Nye’s revised neo-functionalist model, public opinion enters the scheme at two points. First, attitudinal integration—described as definitive appeal—figures in an expanded list of ‘process mechanisms’. In addition to determining whether or not a regional identity exists, Nye argues that it is necessary to assess the degree of salience and urgency attached to it and whether or not it is accompanied by a ‘myth of permanence and inevitability’ (1971: 73). The other side of this variable is the persistence of competing national identities. Secondly, public opinion enters as a variable in the domestic arena influencing the actions of national political leaders. Actors in the original neo-functionalist model—mainly the integrationist technocrats and interest group representatives—need to be supplemented by ‘electoral or support politicians’ whose primary function is to legitimize the actions involved in regional integration. This implies a very clear role for public opinion in the process of integration, which is reinforced by the inclusion of ‘the category of mass opinion, or more accurately of opinion leaders, who create broad or narrow limits for the legitimacy of integrationist programs’ (1971: 63). Media is one of the major catalysts in the proliferation and in the validation of public opinion. Because through this, a political group can draw out what platforms they should espouse so that the electorate will vote for them. In terms of the electorate, public opinion will serve as their contribution in landscaping a new political condition, as well as the status quo of the preexisting politics. Since public opinion formulates how politics should operate there is a great necessity to ensure that such opinions are clearly express in order for it to be addressed and to be recognized. And the most effective means to satisfy such necessity is to use the media. The obvious question which then arises is why the new emphasis did not make an immediate impact on the research agenda. The problem was that, almost as soon as this broadening occurred and before it could really take hold, the theory itself seemed to be bypassed by events and treated by its authors, either explicitly or implicitly, as obsolescent. As noted earlier, it was rescued from oblivion by the resurgence of European integration in the mid-1980s. References: Haas, E. B. (1971). The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-theorizing’. In Regional Integration: Theory and Research: Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. Key, V. O. (1961). Public Opinion and American Democracy: New York: Knopf.